Introduction
On November 12, 1999, President Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB) into law, enacting one of the most far reaching banking and finance laws in history.1 For the first time in decades, banks, through a new holding company structure, would be able to sell and underwrite insurance, as well as underwrite securities without restriction, and even engage in limited investing in traditional commercial business firms. Securities brokerage firms and insurance companies would likewise be able to engage in banking, tearing down long standing legal firewalls that had kept these industries apart for most of the 20 th Century. Market 
By Thomas T. Holyoke
Yet almost immediately, the incredibly complicated regulatory struchlre produced by the law showed strain as the multitude of federal and state banking, investing, and insurance regulators involved began jockeying for preeminent positions of authority from which to guide this new financial sector. Lack of clarity in GLB made their roles ambiguous, granting new powers to many agencies but also imposing checks on this power by providing one agency the authority to overrule another. The law also provided federal regulators with the power to pre-empt state actions but without clear guidance on when and how this could take place. Furthermore, the competition between the interest groups that had struggled against each other during the creation of GLB was undiminished, each launching campaigns advocating the authority of their favorite regulator over the others. Even members of Congress have begun criticizing the agencies for ambiguous rules and inability to work in concert.
Assuming that this conflict is a product of the complex regulatory structure created by GLB, the question is why was such an unwieldy system ever set up when lawmakers might have provided a more firm structure with clear delegations of authority. The search for an answer begins with a brief historical overview of banking and finance policy in the United States. The development of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the regulatory structure it produced are then discussed. Attention is given to the conflicts that have emerged as a consequence of the act. Finally, GLB is examined through a perspective that combines different theories of policy making. The discussion concludes that, given the array of conflicts between the many competing actors on this issue, GLB could not have been anything but the confusing and conflict-laden product that it is.
The Financial Modernization Debate

A Brief History of Banking Policy in the United States
In 1933 percent of total holding company assets. 13 The Federal
Reserve had also loosened its policies on the level of investments a holding company could make in non-bank commercial firms, so-called merchant banking authority, long a prime market for the brokerage houses.
With the securities and insurance industries pushing into banking and claiming greater shares of the nation's wealth, and banks pushing back through their regulators by eroding Glass-Steagall, eyes began to turn to Congress for a legislative solution.
Theoretical Perspectives on Policy Making and Regulatory Structure
Political scientists have devoted decades of research and hundreds of pages in leading journals to theories of policy making and regulatory structure. The paradigm dominating this scholarship in the 1950s and 1960s was one assuming a multiplicity of competing interest groups representing different segments of society. This "pluralist" theory held that interest groups competed with each other on behalf of society until an agreement could be reached regarding the structure of public policy. After this equilibrium was reached, Congress would dutifully pass legislation cementing the agreement into law and
THE BATTLE IS OVER, BUT THE WAR GOES ON
regulatory agencies would carry it OUt. 14 Pluralism began to unravel as a theory because scholars believed it assumed too much equality and failed to account for the unequal distribution of power and benefits between interest groups, and because little evidence was found to actually support it empirically. 15 Contemporary perspectives on policymaking reverse pluralism by assuming that laws are enacted when the preferences of legislators, not interest groups, are congruent enough to get the minimum number of votes to pass a bill. 16 Regulatory agencies, in this "legislative control" paradigm, respond to the will of legislators, and interest groups are marginalized into mere" service bureaus" that provide the information congressmen require in order to enact the policies they desire, or as contributors of money for re-election campaigns. If both legislators and interest groups have policy preferences they are attempting to enact into law, then interest groups will ally themselves with like-minded legislators and the array of competition between groups will be reflected in the legislative battles within Congress. This means that a high level of conflict between interest groups will translate into conflict between legislators and produce vague laws giving regulators broad interpretive powers. If such a broad bill also requires the involvement of many agencies, such ill-defined language will almost certainly create conflict and merely embed the interest group / legislative conflict in a dysfunctional regulatory structure.
The legislative history of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act reflects this integrated perspective more satisfactorily then either of the two component theories alone. Without the necessary compromises between interests groups, detailed below, legislators would not have been able to reach enough of a consensus to enact a bill. Yet since these interests and lawmakers could only compromise at the most general level, the resulting product failed to provide any real resolution to the issue.
Financial Modernization Debate in Congress:
Conflict and Compromise
Efforts to redefine the banking and finance sectors through statutory change were not new to Congress.
Legislation had been in the offering for decades, and the Senate had passed a bill in 1982, though the House failed to act on it. Several proposals had also been floated around the House during the 103rd Congress in the early 1990s, but without action. 19 The principle reason for this lack of congressional action was due to a peculiar equi- 
The Rise of Agency Competition
While such compromises were essential to garner enough support from orga~zed interests to enact the legislation, the result is a patchwork regulatory structure dependent for its success on the capacity of historically competitive federal and st,lle agencies to cooperate. Finally, the attempt to begin developing uniformity in the state insurance laws in order to ward off the creation of NARAB has nearly stalled. While optimistically declaring that it would be able to facilitate such parity, For those who study how executive branch agencies implement public policy, explanations as to why one agency may stick closely to the intent of Congress while another appears to sharply diverge, or why one agency can promulgate an acceptable policy while another creates a firestorm, may be found in the politics behind the policy's creation. Those who decide to search for the origins of a controversial policy are likely to find that conflict over implementation is not so much a product of aggressive regulators acting independently as it is the product of deeply embedded structural problems created by the politics surrounding its enactment. Given the breadth of conflict and the alignment of preferences by interest groups and legislators, it is not surprising that
POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Gramm-Leach-Bliley failed to bring closure to longstanding fights over the structure of the financial industry, and in fact appears to be sparking even more conflict. It could not have come out otherwise. The task of regulators and policy analysts in the future will be to try to walk a fine line between these interests if they hope to successfully bring coherence.fo financial regulation.
Notes:
I The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act started life as H.R. 10 in the 105 1h
Congress. Reintroduced as the same number in the 106 1h Congress, it was ultimately superceded by the Senate bill, S. 900. Upon final enactment, the legislation became Public Law 106-102.
2 The Citigroup prototype was created through the merger ofCiticorp (the Citibank holding company) and Travelers Group (holding Travelers Life Insurance) and was completed prior to the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. While technically legal under certain temporary provisions in the Bank Holding Company Act, Citigroup would have been forced to divest much of its insurance and investing businesses ifGLB not been passed. 3 A concise history of the movement of banks into the securities markets prior to 1929, the collapse itself, and the subsequent enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act are details in Edward J. Supp. 308, 1976. 7 "Section 20" refers to a section number in the Glass-Steagall Act permitting banks a very limited form of investing. The Bank Holding Company Act permits holding companies to establish subsidiaries inVolved in business "closely related to" banking, with the Federal Reserve acting as interpreter of what this standard might mean. In 1987 the Federal Reserve interpreted it to mean that bank holding companies could establish section 20 subsidiaries with more freedom to act than any bank subsidiary.
